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INTRODUCTION

When Ed Cohen honored me with the invitation to present the principal paper on state and local taxation of electronic commerce for this
conference, I was pleased to accept, but with one caveat. Because most
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia; A.B., Harvard, 1967; J.D., University of
Chicago, 1970. This paper is a derivation of a presentation given by Professor Hellerstein at the
International Tax Institute Symposium sponsored by the University of Miami School of Law in
February 1998.
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of my waking hours over the past year seem to have been consumed by
the preparation of papers addressed to state taxation of electronic commerce, 1 I warned Ed that much of what I might have to say would not be
new-at least to me.
But a funny thing happened on the way to this forum. When I set

about my task to prepare yet another paper on state taxation of electronic
commerce, fully expecting-in the finest academic tradition-to canni-

balize my earlier writing, I found that there were, in fact, a number of
significant issues on which I had barely touched in my previous efforts
or that deserved considerably more attention than I had given them.

More importantly, the intense debate that has been raging during the past
year or so over state taxation of electronic commerce-particularly with
regard to proposed legislative solutions to the problem-has raised additional issues that warrant consideration. Finally, since at least two of the
distinguished commentators on my paper were acquainted with my earlier work,2 I felt liberated from the obligation to repeat much of what I
said before.3
In this paper, then, I have approached the topic of state taxation of

electronic commerce in a somewhat less systematic and formal mode
than in my earlier efforts, and more with an eye to some of the issues

that have emerged in recent discussions of the subject.4 Whether or not
1. See Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, TAX L. REv.
(forthcoming 1998); Walter Hellerstein, Transaction Taxes and Electronic Commerce Designing
State Taxes That Work in an Interstate Environment, 50 NAT'L TAX J. 593 (1997); Walter
Hellerstein, State Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Preliminary Thoughts on Model Uniform
Legislation, Paper prepared for a symposium on multijurisdictional taxation of electronic
commerce at Harvard Law School (Apr. 5, 1997), in 12 STATE TAX NOTES 1315 (1997)
[hereinafter Preliminary Thoughts]; Walter Hellerstein, Telecommunications and Electronic
Commerce Overview and Appraisal, Paper prepared for Conference of Taxation and
Telecommunications (Nov. 11-12, 1996), in 12 STATE TAX NoTEs 519 (1997); REPORT No. 1 OF
THE

DRAFTING

COMMITrEE

OF THE NATIONAL

TAX

ASSOCIATION'S

COMMUNICATIONS

AND

(Nov. 1997), reprinted in 13 STATE TAX NOTES 1255
(1997) [hereinafter NTA ELECTRONIC COMMERCE REPORT]. I am Chairman of the Drafting
Committee, whose other members are James Eads, Harley Duncan, Ellen Fishbein, Paull Mines,
and Bruce Reid.
2. Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah was the panel moderator at the Harvard Law School
symposium where I delivered one of my earlier papers. See Preliminary Thoughts, supra note 1.
He also presented a paper on international taxation of electronic commerce at the New York
University Law School Graduate Tax Faculty Symposium, at which I delivered another one of my
earlier papers. See State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, supra note 1. Paull Mines was a
commentator on my New York University Law School paper, and we have collaborated closely in
the National Tax Association's Communications and Electronic Commerce Tax Project, where we
are both members of the Drafting Committee. See NTA ELECTRONIC COMMERCE REPORT, supra
note I.
3. My liberation, I must confess, was tempered by some trepidation, because of my
traditional training in the reinvent-the-wheel mode of scholarship that is all too familiar to law
journal readers.
4. In particular, the dialogue that is certainly occurring in connection with the National Tax
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE TAX PROJECT
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the paper "moves the ball forward"-the precondition of its ascension
into academic Elysium-I hope that it will contribute to the public dialogue regarding state taxation of electronic commerce.

II.

THE SCOPE OF THE SOLUTION TO THE ELECTRONIC

COMMERCE PROBLEM

No one seems to have any trouble describing the "problem" of state
taxation of electronic commerce. If massive amounts of economic activity will soon be conducted through electronic commerce by remote service providers engaged in nontraceable transactions from unidentifiable
locations, it does not take a rocket scientist (or even a state tax lawyer)
to appreciate the difficult questions raised by this eventuality. Which
states, if any, will have jurisdiction to impose (or require collection of)
taxes on the sales or income generated by such economic activity? To
which states should the receipts or the income from such economic
activity be assigned? And how will states administer, and taxpayers
comply with, a taxing regime that attempts to capture the receipts or
income from such economic activity?
While it may be easy enough to describe the "problem" of state
taxation of electronic commerce, one of the key issues that has emerged
from the discussions it has spawned is the scope of the solution to that
problem. If we keep our sights narrowly focused on electronic commerce, and view the task as devising an approach that best accommodates our existing tax structure to this particular slice of economic
activity, we may settle upon a solution that deals with electronic commerce and nothing else. Some of the early efforts to fashion a legislative
solution to the electronic commerce problem have taken such a focused
approach-in large part because they were responding to the particular
problem at hand.5
Such narrow solutions to the electronic commerce problem, however, create problems of their own. A set of taxing provisions directed
only at electronic commerce will produce a disparity between the tax
treatment of electronic commerce and conventional commerce. More
fundamentally, there may be problems raised by state taxation of electronic commerce that cannot be resolved satisfactorily without making
Association's Communications and Electronic Commerce Tax Project, see NTA ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE TAX REPORT, supra note 1, and that occurred at the seminar "Transaction Taxation:

Telecommunications & Electronic Commerce" (jointly sponsored by the Institute for
Professionals in Taxation and the National Tax Association (Feb. 2-3, 1998)), inspired a number
of the topics addressed in this paper. This paper does, however, draw freely from my earlier work
in the area. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
5. See Preliminary Thoughts, supra note 1; NTA ELECTRONIC COMMERCE REPORT, supra
note 1.
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basic changes in the overall taxing regime. Consequently, in approaching the question of how to fix the tax system to accommodate electronic

commerce, we must confront the question of whether that "fix" necessarily must extend beyond electronic commerce itself.
Consider, for example, the matter of sales and use taxation of electronic commerce. There is virtually universal agreement that there are

serious difficulties with applying existing sales and use tax regimes to
electronic commerce. Two of these difficulties-the nexus or jurisdictional issue and the double taxation or pyramiding

issue-are

illustrative.
A.

Nexus

There is widespread recognition that traditional nexus criteria are
ill-suited to the creation of sensible and administrable rules for determin-

ing the taxability of taxpayers or transactions in electronic commerce.
Traditional tax jurisdiction or "nexus" principles, after all, are rooted in
concepts of territoriality, and the physical presence of the taxpayer in the
state. 6 Indeed, although the U.S. Supreme Court has abandoned physical presence as the touchstone of Due Process Clause nexus, 7 it has

retained the physical-presence standard, however grudgingly, 8 as a litmus test of Commerce Clause nexus,9 at least in the context of sales and

use tax taxes.' 0 In any event, whether we are talking about traditional
concepts of jurisdiction to tax based on physical presence or more "mod-

ern" concepts of jurisdiction to tax based on "economic" presence, we
are still counting contacts-tangible or intangible.
But, such an approach makes little sense in cyberspace. The signal

characteristic of cyberspace is the irrelevance of geographic borders. As
6. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (holding that no state can exercise jurisdiction
and authority over persons and property outside of its territory).
7. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
8. Despite its reaffirmation of the physical-presence standard of National Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), the Court was almost apologetic in its defense of
the old rule. The Court acknowledged that its recent Commerce Clause decisions-like its
modem Due Process Clause decisions-signalled a "retreat from the formalistic stringent physical
presence test in favor of a more flexible substantive approach." Quill, 504 U.S. at 314. Moreover,
the Court conceded that its "contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not dictate" the
result reached in Bellas Hess "were the issue to arise for the first time today." Id. at 311.
Furthermore, the Court recognized that, "[l]ike other bright-line tests, the Bellas Hess rule appears
artificial at the edges" by drawing a constitutional line in the sand between commercial activity
"purposefully directed" to a state through physical presence and economically equivalent
commercial activity "purposefully directed" to a state through other means. Id. at 315.
9. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 309-19.
10. But see Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina State Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 18-19 (S.C.),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993) (ruling that a state has jurisdiction to tax out-of-state taxpayer
with no physical presence in the state on income earned from licensing trademarks to in-state
licensee).
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the co-directors of the Cyberspace Law Institute have declared, "[g]lobal

computer-based communications cut across territorial borders, creating a
new realm of human activity and undermining the feasibility-and legitimacy-of laws based on geographic boundaries."1 This thought has
not been lost on those seeking a solution to the problems raised by state
taxation of electronic commerce. They recognize that "traditional concepts of nexus may not be entirely appropriate for electronic commerce
and Internet related services," 12 and that we need to "rethink nexus stan-

dards as they apply to the Internet and Internet-based transactions." 13
Whatever may be the appropriate nexus standards for the Brave
New World of electronic commerce, however, one cannot, as a practical
matter, ignore the question whether those standards should be confined

to electronic commerce. For example, suppose it were determined that a
sensible sales and use tax regime for electronic commerce would require
vendors to collect and remit sales or use taxes on sales of electronicallytransmitted information and services to the states in which the customers

received such information or services (at least in circumstances under
which the vendor could reasonably identify such states). Accordingly,
suppose it were further determined that creation of such a regime

required the establishment of nexus over an out-of-state vendor in the
states in which such information or services were received.' 4
But, if such a regime would make sense for electronic commerce,
one might reasonably ask why it would not make equally good sense for
11. David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,48
STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996).
12. Information Technology Association of America, Straight Talk: Internet, Tax &
Electronic Commerce: A White Paper on Taxation of Electronic Commerce and the Internet 10
(undated and unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Miami Law Review)
[hereinafter ITAA White Paper].
13. Interactive Services Association, Logging On to Cyberspace Tax Policy: An Interactive
Services Association Task Force White Paper(Dec. 1996), reprintedin 12 STATE TAX NOTES 209,
221 (1997) [hereinafter ISA White Paper]. The U.S. Treasury has made the same point in the
context of U.S. income taxation of international transactions:
The concept of a U.S. trade or business was developed in the context of
conventional types of commerce, which generally are conducted through
identifiable physical locations. Electronic commerce, on the other hand, may be
conducted without regard to national boundaries and may dissolve the link between
an income producing activity and a specific location. From a certain perspective,
electronic commerce doesn't seem to occur in any physical location but instead
takes place in the nebulous world of "cyberspace." Persons engaged in electronic
commerce could be located anywhere in the world and their customers will be
ignorant of, or indifferent to, their location.
Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Policy, Selected Tax Policy Implications of Global
Electronic Commerce, in 97 TAx NoEs TODAY 90, 91 [hereinafter Treasury White Paper].
14. This part of the paper is not concerned with the merits of such a proposal or whether it
could be implemented constitutionally. These questions, however, are addressed in Parts III and
IV, infra.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:691

non-electronic commerce. In other words, if an ideal sales and use tax
regime is one in which vendors can be required to collect and remit the
tax to the customer's state, is that any less true for the sale of tangible
personal property by a mail-order vendor than it is for the sale of electronically-transmitted information or services by the electronic commerce vendor?
If the answer to that question is "no," then we suddenly find ourselves confronted not with the task of crafting a solution to the problem
of electronic commerce, but rather with the broader task of determining
the appropriate nexus rules for sales and use taxes generally, at least
insofar as such taxes are applied to sales by remote vendors. While this
may make perfect economic sense and appeal to "an academic desire for
tidiness," 15 it could create significant political impediments to solving
the electronic tax problem. Whatever may be the political difficulties of
fashioning a rational solution to the problem of electronic commerce, the
political difficulties of establishing new nexus rules for all sales and use
taxes may be even more daunting. One need only look to the seemingly
interminable negotiations over the problem of requiring out-of-state
mail-order vendors to collect use taxes on their sales to in-state purchasers 16 -not to mention the public outcry at the very suggestion that outof-state vendors had agreed to collect such taxes ' 7 -to gauge the political hazards of attempting to forge a broader solution to the nexus
problem.
But the alternative is clearly worse. If we confine our solution to
electronic commerce, we violate one of the basic tenets of good tax policy-to which virtually all parties concerned with state taxation of electronic commerce adhere-namely, that there should be competitive
equality between similarly situated economic actors. This means that
those who provide goods or services in electronic commerce should be
taxed no differently from those who provide goods or services in conventional commerce. As one "white paper" devoted to state and local
taxation of on-line services declared, "businesses that provide services
over the information highway ...should not be subjected to different
taxes from those that are imposed on businesses that provide competing
services separate from the information highway . . . or from those
imposed on the general business taxpayer." 8 Another such "white
15.
16.
States,
17.

Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 290 (1960).
See Carol Douglas, Prospects Dim for Prompt Accord Between Direct Marketers and
in 13 STATE TAX NOTES 1235 (1997).
See David Cay Johnston, Angry Customers Hinder Mail Order Tax Accord, N.Y. TiMEs,

Nov. 7, 1997, at D1.
18. Information Highway State and Local Tax Study Group, Supporting the Information
Highway: A Frameworkfor State and Local Taxation of Telecommunications and Information
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paper" also observed that "[i]ntangible products sold and delivered over
the Internet should be treated the same way for tax purposes as products
purchased off-line in the tangible world."' 9
Establishing one nexus regime for electronic commerce while
maintaining another, more taxpayer-friendly regime for mail-order sellers involved in traditional commerce would fly in the face of these
precepts. Thus, if a billing-address nexus regime were established for
electronic commerce, but traditional mail-order sales continued to be
governed by the bright-line, physical presence rule of Quill, there would
be a tax-induced incentive to make traditional mail-order purchases
rather than purchases using the Internet. There is no justification for
tilting the playing field in that fashion, and any solution to the electronic
commerce tax problem should be designed to avoid such competitive
inequalities.
B.

Pyramiding

In theory, a retail sales tax, like those in force in forty-five states
and the District of Columbia,2" is a single-stage levy imposed on the
final sale of goods or services to the consumer. 2 This essential feature
of a retail sales tax is reflected in provisions that exclude intermediate
transactions in the economic process from taxation. Such provisions are
designed to avoid the pyramiding or double taxation that would result if
both intermediate and final sales were subject to tax.
Every state, for example, excludes sales for resale from the retail
sales tax base. Similarly, sales of ingredients or components of property
produced for sale are typically excluded from the retail sales tax. Still
other provisions reflect the broader view that costs of producing articles
that will ultimately be sold should be excluded from the retail sales tax
base, even though the costs cannot be tied directly to the purchase of the
finished item or one of its component parts. Exclusions or exemptions
for purchases of machinery and equipment used to produce tangible personal property for sale illustrates these sorts of provisions.
The pyramiding problem is particularly acute in the context of elecServices (undated), reprinted in 9

STATE TAX NoTEs 57, 61 (1995) [hereinafter SALT Study
Group White Paper].
19. ITAA White Paper, supra note 12, at 10.
20. See 2 State Tax Guide (CCH) 60-100 (1997). Only Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New
Hampshire, and Oregon fail to impose a general state sales and use tax. Currently, sales taxes are
the most significant source of state tax revenue, yielding thirty-four percent of such revenue. See
generally JOHN F. DuE & JOHN MIKESELL, SALES TAXATION: STATE AND LOCAL STRUCTURE AND
ADMINISTRATION (2d ed. 1994).
21. In this respect, the retail sales tax may be distinguished from a general sales or gross
receipts tax, which is imposed on intermediate sales.
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tronic commerce for two reasons. First, the states' separate taxation of
related services (e.g., telecommunications, data processing, and information services) creates the risk that each separately-identified service will
be taxed even if they are all part of a single economic process. Second,
the sale-for-resale exemption is not as clearly refined with respect to the
sale of services as it is with respect to the sale of tangible personal property. This is because states generally have less experience in taxing
services and because services, by their very nature, are often more difficult to trace in space and in time than are items of tangible property.
Consequently, while it is easy enough to follow steel used to manufacture a car from the foundry to the retail show room (and thus, to exempt
it under a sale-for-resale exemption until the final sale of the car), it is
difficult to follow the telecommunications service used to provide an
information service purchased through an on-line service provider.
Thus, courts are more likely to find the latter "consumed" rather than
"resold" by the information or on-line service provider.
It is, therefore, understandable that many observers want
lawmakers to address the pyramiding problem raised by the taxation of
electronic commerce. The Information Technology Association of
America urged that "[s]tate and local governments should take action to
prevent double taxation."22 Similarly, the Information Highway State
and Local Tax Study Group-an ad hoc group of many of the nation's
leading telecommunications, cable, and software companies-urged that
"tax exemptions in the context of the sale of information highway services be designed and construed to ensure that only the final sale of a
taxable information highway service can be subject to tax."23
The precise scope of this policy objective, however, is uncertain.
Despite the theoretical premise that the retail sales tax is a single-stage
levy on consumer expenditures, and despite the existence of statutory
provisions that exclude intermediate purchases in the economic process
from the retail sales tax, producers' purchases make up a healthy portion
of most states' sales tax bases. Indeed, a nationwide study concluded
that producers' share of the sales tax base averaged forty percent for
forty-five states and the District of Columbia. 4 Typical taxable business purchases are those in which the business entity is deemed to be the
ultimate consumer of the particular item purchased, even though the cost
of the item will likely constitute a portion of the price of the product that
the business sells. For example, transportation equipment, office furni22. ITAA White Paper, supra note 12, at 12.
23. SALT Study Group White Paper, supra note 18, at 64.
24. See Raymond J. Ring, Jr., The Proportion of Consumers' and Producers' Goods in the
General Sales Tax, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 167, 175 (1989).
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ture, advertising catalogs, and supplies purchased by manufacturers and
other businesses are usually taxable under state sales taxes. Yet, the cost
of these items is likely to be reflected in the final cost of the products
that the business sells. Consequently, these items are effectively subjected to a second tax, assuming the products sold by the business are
taxable.
As noted above, the same problem exists in connection with electronic commerce. For example, if an on-line service provider purchases
and pays tax on telecommunications services and, in turn, collects tax on
the charges for the services it sells to its customers at a price that
includes the value of the purchased telecommunications services, there
will be double taxation in an economic sense. Yet, many state taxing
regimes would treat the on-line service as the taxable consumer of the
telecommunications service while imposing a tax on the full charge for
the on-line service provider's services to its customer.
Accordingly, while avoiding double taxation of electronic commerce is a worthy and widely-shared objective, implementation of that
objective, at least in the context of sales and use taxation, is complicated
by the well-entrenched tradition of taxing many business inputs under
state retail sales taxes. This once again raises the question as to the
appropriate scope of the solution to the electronic commerce tax problem.2 5 If eliminating taxation of business inputs makes sense for sales
and use taxation for electronic commerce, which it plainly does, why
does it not make equal sense for other forms of commerce?
The answer, once again, is that it does make sense, but that the
political difficulties of achieving this broad objective-by a "radical
restructuring of the sales tax itself' so that "all inputs and sales for resale
[w]ould be exempt from sales taxation" 2 6-may be greater than achieving it with respect to electronic commerce alone. Nevertheless, as suggested above, the alternative to the more sweeping reform may be worse
than accomplishing the desired result through half-measures addressed
solely to electronic commerce.
A separate solution to the pyramiding problem in the domain of
electronic commerce would undermine the goal of achieving competitive equality between electronic commerce and conventional commerce.
If only electronic commerce enjoyed a regime in which all business
inputs were exempt from sales and use taxation, electronic commerce
transactions would be favored over competing transactions in conventional commerce. There is no more justification for favoring electronic
25. As in the case of nexus.
26. Matthew N. Murray, Telecommunication Services and Electronic Commerce:
Technology Break the Back of the Sales Tax?, 12 STATE TAX NOTES 273, 279 (1997).

Will
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commerce over other forms of commerce than there is for subjecting it

to more onerous tax burdens than those imposed on other forms of
commerce.
C.

Concluding Thoughts on the "Scope of the Solution" Issue

The simple but important conclusion that emerges from this discussion is that the solution to the electronic commerce problem has implications extending far beyond electronic commerce alone. This raises the
fundamental question whether, in seeking to solve the electronic commerce problem, we should also seek to resolve analogous problems
raised by other forms of commerce, or whether we should keep our
attention narrowly focused on the electronic commerce problem.
To some extent, we have no choice. We must deal with some of the
problems that are closely related to electronic commerce in order not to
make matters worse. For example, it would be ludicrous to create a
nexus regime for electronic commerce that did not apply equally to
mail-order sellers when they are engaged in economically-equivalent
transactions. There simply is no reason to favor one form of commerce
over another. Similarly, there is no good reason for providing more
favorable resale exemptions for electronic commerce than for competing
forms of economic activity.
The broader question, however, is whether we should stop there.
Why not, as Charles McLure has suggested, use the electronic commerce issue as an opportunity to fix the sales tax generally? 7 In effect,
the electronic commerce problem provides us with an opportunity to
engage in a "radical restructuring of the sales tax itself."28 There is
much to be said for capitalizing on the intense interest in the electronic
commerce problem as a vehicle for bringing greater rationality to the
overall sales tax structure. Nevertheless, I believe that we must be cautious in pushing the "radical restructuring" agenda too far. While we do
have an opportunity to achieve real changes in the sales and use tax that
necessarily will extend beyond electronic commerce, it is important that
we keep our finger on the pulse of political reality so that we do not end
up sacrificing the opportunity for real reform on the altar of a utopian
solution to problems raised by the sales tax as we know it today.
III.

STRUCTURING A SOLUTION TO THE ELECTRONIC

COMMERCE PROBLEM

Any meaningful solution to the problems raised by state taxation of
27. See Charles E. McLure, Jr., Electronic Commerce and the Tax Assignment Problem:
Preserving Sovereignty in a Digital World, 14 STATE TAX NOTES 1169 (1998).
28. Murray, supra note 26, at 279.
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electronic commerce must address the central questions of who is subject to tax (or tax collection responsibilities) and where the tax base is
subject to tax. In addition, any such solution will be viable only if it is
administrable, which means that uniformity and simplicity will be essential features of a sound tax regime for electronic commerce. This section of the paper considers how such a regime might be structured, and it

addresses some of the issues that implementation of such a regime is
likely to raise.
A.

Nexus and Situsing Principles

Any statutory solution2 9 to the problems raised by state taxation of
electronic commerce must tackle the nexus issue if it is going to. be of
much practical benefit to the industry and the states. The nexus issue is

second to none in the consternation it has created in discussions of state
taxation of electronic commerce and in its unsuitability to resolution
under existing legal criteria. Moreover, without a solution to the nexus

issue, sensible solutions to other critical issues (e.g., apportioning
income and situsing sales) will be difficult, if not impossible. For example, it makes little sense to assign the sales, use, or income tax base to a
state where the taxpayer is not taxable, 3 ° or to assign the sales or use tax
base to a state in which the vendor cannot be required to collect the
tax. 3
As suggested above, traditional approaches to the nexus question
appear doomed to failure in the context of taxation of electronic commerce. To ask about the "location" of electronic commerce-whether
that location is defined in terms of physical contacts (e.g., the presence
29. Because a statutory solution along the lines suggested below may not be entirely
consistent with existing constitutional restraints on state taxation, see Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,
504 U.S. 298 (1992), or, in some instances, with the states' own constitutional limitations on state
taxation, and because uniformity is not likely to be achieved without congressional legislation, I
am assuming that the legislative proposals discussed below would be implemented by
congressional legislation. The question of Congress' power to enact such legislation is considered
in Part IV, infra.
30. I use the term "taxable" in the same way it is used in the Uniform Division of Income for
Tax Purposes Act, which provides: "[A] taxpayer is taxable in another state if ... that state has
jurisdiction to subject the taxpayer to ... tax regardless of whether, in fact, the state does or does
not." 7A U.L.A. 331, § 3 (West Supp. 1997) [hereinafter UDITPA].
31. To be sure, when this problem does arise, a "throwback" or "throwaround" rule can
provide a default regime for situsing sales as an antidote to this problem. See infra notes 37-43
and accompanying text. But, it is hardly desirable from the standpoint of policy or practice to
design a system where the default rule plays a significant role. Insofar as it is possible, one ought
to design the attribution rules appropriately in the first place, without having to resort to a default
rule that effectively changes the normal attribution rule, in order to assure that the tax base is
available for taxation by some jurisdiction. See Walter Hellerstein, Construing the Uniform
Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act: Reflections on the Illinois Supreme Court's Reading of
the "Throwback" Rule, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 768 (1978).
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of computer servers or leased telecommunications lines) or nonphysical
contacts (e.g., the deemed presence of intangibles or electromagnetic
impulses)-is to ask a question that is not worth answering. The reason
is two-fold.
First, the location of those tangible or intangible contacts often will
bear little relationship to the location of the essential economic activity
that electronic commerce comprises-the production and consumption
of information. Second, even if the location of those tangible and intangible contacts were relevant to the location of electronic commerce, the
location of those contacts can be changed so easily (without affecting the
underlying transaction in electronic commerce) that efforts to prevent
tax avoidance by creative tax planning are likely to be futile. If the
server's presence is relevant, Oregon (a state with no sales tax) will soon
become the server capital of the world; if the presence of the electronic
impulse is relevant, those impulses will be routed through nontaxable
paths (assuming one can even trace the paths through which they are
routed).
What we need instead is a fresh approach that essentially "reverse
engineers" the nexus issue. The first question ought to be what kind of
taxing regime will allow participants in electronic commerce to pay and
collect taxes in an administratively feasible fashion to those states with a
legitimate claim to the tax revenues. Once we answer that question, we
can build our nexus rules (and also our tax sourcing or situsing rules)
around such a regime.
1.

BILLING-ADDRESS

NEXUS AND SITUSING REGIME

With regard to sales and use taxes imposed on transactions in electronic commerce, we need a regime in which vendors can be certain
about their tax collection obligations and can comply with them at reasonable administrative costs. One way of achieving these objectives
would be by establishing nexus over the out-of-state vendor in the state
of the purchaser, defined by reference to the purchaser's billing address
or other locational information furnished to the vendor by the purchaser
(e.g., the area code and local exchange from which the purchaser
accessed the seller's Web site)." The vendor who obtained such information in good faith would be able to rely on it in remitting the tax to
the purchaser's state.33
32. A wireless industry group has proposed that state sales and other transaction taxes
imposed on mobile telecommunications be limited to charges that are billed to customers whose
primary use of the mobile telecommunications services is within the taxing state. Proposalfor
Uniform Sourcing for Mobile Telecommunications Taxes, reprinted in 13 STATE TAX NoTEs 717

(1997).
33. The statute implementing such a regime might read something like this:
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The use of the purchaser's billing address (or some other convention for determining the purchaser's location) as establishing the state of

the sale's situs (along with a nexus rule that creates jurisdiction over the
out-of-state vendor in that state) is consistent with the underlying theory
of a sales tax as a tax on personal consumption. Thus, Charles McLure
has observed that "[s]tate sales taxes are, in principle, levied on a destination basis"3 4 and that destination-based sales taxation has strong conceptual appeal as a matter of both equity and efficiency. 35 Analyzing the
question of where electronic commerce transactions should be taxed
under a sales tax, William Fox and Matthew Murray likewise conclude

that "a destination tax should be adopted to the maximum extent possible to obtain neutral treatment of services delivered from different
locations." 3 6
2.

DEFAULT SITUSING PRINCIPLE: "THROWBACK" AND
"'THROWAROUND" RULES

To deal with cases in which the vendor is unable to determine the
purchaser's billing address, a regime that uses the customer's billing
address as the primary nexus and situsing rule might include a sales tax

version of the familiar income tax "throwback" rule.37 Under the
"throwback" rule embodied in the Uniform Division of Income for Tax
Purposes Act,38 sales of tangible personal property, which are normally
assigned to the destination state in the sales factor of the tax apportionment formula, are "thrown back" to the state of origin when the taxpayer

is not taxable in the destination state. In the sales tax context, the statute
might provide for a "throwback" of the sale to the state of origin when
the vendor was unable by reasonable and good faith efforts to determine
Every vendor who makes a taxable sale of electronically transmitted information or
services to a purchaser in this state shall collect from the purchaser the sales or use
tax imposed by [here refer to the state's sales and use tax] on the sale or use of such
information or services and shall remit the tax to this state. A purchaser is "in this
state" if his billing address is in this state, and if his billing address can be
determined by reasonable and good faith efforts.
34. McLure, supra note 27, at 1174.
35. See id. McLure notes that the benefits of public expenditures are more closely related to
household consumption than to production, so that the destination rule (assigning the tax base to
the consumer's location) is fair and creates responsible government. See id. He also notes that
origin-based taxes distort the location of economic activity, unless they are levied at uniform rates.
See id.
36. William F. Fox & Matthew N. Murray, The Sales Tax and Electronic Commerce: So
What's New?, 50 NAT'L TAX J. 573, 575 (1997).
37. See UDITPA, supra note 30, § 16.
38. See id.
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the purchaser's billing address. 39
As an alternative to the "throwback" rule, the statute might provide

for a "throwaround" rule that effectively distributes sales to unidentifiable purchasers to states where the vendor makes sales to identifiable

purchasers. The "throwaround" rule serves the same function as the
"throwback" rule, but, rather than assigning the tax base to the single
state from which the sales are made or in which the taxpayer's principal

place of business is located,4" it spreads the tax base around all of the

states in which the vendor makes taxable sales of electronically-transmitted information or services.4 1
39. Cf.Jerome R. Hellerstein, The Quill Case: What the States Can Do to Undo the Effects of
the Decision, 4 STATE TAX NOTES 273-74 (1993). Hellerstein states that:
To plug up the mail-order house and other out-of-state loopholes in use tax
collection, I suggest that the states modify their statutes by adding a sales tax
throwback provision with respect to sales of property that is delivered to the
purchaser in another state, in the event that the state is not empowered under the
Supreme Court's de6isions to require the vendor to collect that state's use tax and no
sales or use tax is in fact paid to the destination state. Under the proposed
throwback rule, the sales tax would be imposed by the state only if the purchased
property is shipped from an office, store, warehouse, factory, or other place of
storage within the state.
Such a provision might read as follows:
If, after making reasonable and good faith efforts to determine the purchaser's billing address, the vendor of electronically-transmitted information or services is
unable to determine such address, or, if such a billing address does not exist, the
vendor shall collect from the purchaser any sales or use tax that may be imposed by
this state on the sale or use of such information or services, if the vendor's principal
place of business is in this state.
In the context of sales and use taxation of electronic commerce, a rule more consistent with the
traditional throwback concept might throw the sale back to the state from which the vendor electronically transmitted such services. Such a rule, however, can be easily manipulated because of
the ease with which the origin of electronic transmissions can be arranged. Moreover, once we
deviate from the place of consumption (or a proxy therefor, such as billing address) in a sales tax
regime, practical rather than theoretical considerations should play a greater role in the evaluation
of our second-best solution. On the other hand, one might object to a throwback to the state of the
taxpayer's principal place of business on the ground that the state of the taxpayer's principal place
of business might have no connection with the transaction, arguably rendering the throwback
unconstitutional. For these reasons, the use of a traditional throwback rule might be more
appropriate.
40. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
41. Such a rule might read as follows:
If, after making reasonable and good faith efforts to determine the purchaser's
billing address, the vendor of electronically transmitted information or services is
unable to determine such address, or if such a billing address does not exist, the
vendor shall collect from the purchaser a sales tax equal to the average sales tax rate
that the vendor collected on all sales of electronically-transmitted information or
services during the preceding calendar year. The tax so collected during any
calendar year shall be paid to the states in the same proportion that the vendor's
sales and use taxes on electronically-transmitted information or services were paid
to the states during the preceding calendar year.
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The "throwaround" rule is admittedly a novel concept, which could

be criticized on a number of grounds, including the establishment of an
"arbitrary" tax rate for the sales and the assumption that all sales are
taxed rather than merely taxable.4" The principal virtue of the rule is
that, by comparison to the throwback rule, the "throwaround rule"
results in a more equitable distribution of sales tax revenues than a rule

that assigns such revenues to a single state. If the "default" mechanism
of a throwback or throwaround rule is to play a significant role in a sales
and use tax regime directed at electronic commerce, due to the difficulty

in many cases of identifying the billing address of the purchaser, it may
make sense at least to think about the possibility of spreading the tax
base among the states in which the electronic information or services of
the taxpayer are generally "consumed" rather than assigning them to a
single state that does not correspond to the state in which the taxpayer's
information or services are consumed. The throwaround rule is also a
practical solution to a difficult administrative problem 4 3-a solution that

assumes that sales with unknown destinations occur in the same pattern
as sales with known destinations. Moreover, on that assumption, it
reflects the constitutional principle that sales must occur within the taxing state to be taxable.
3.

COLLECTION OF TAX BY VENDOR FROM PURCHASER

It is important to recognize one assumption that underlies the proposed statutory regime described above. Regardless of the payment

mechanism-be it check, credit card, debit card, prepaid cash card (e.g.,
"Visacash"), or even electronic cash-it is assumed that the vendor
would add the appropriate tax to the purchaser's bill and remit that
42. Under the traditional "throwback" concept, income (or, in our case, sales) is "thrown
back" to the state of origin only when the vendor is not taxable in the purchaser's state (see
UDITPA, supra note 30, § 16), or, in the sales tax context, when the purchaser's state cannot be
determined. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. It is the inability of the destination state
to tax-rather than its decision to forbear from exercising its taxing power-that justifies the
"throwback." If a taxpayer is taxable in the taxing state, even if the taxing state does not exercise
its power to tax, there is no "throwback." The "throwaround" rule, however, effectively assumes
that all sales into states where the purchaser cannot be identified are taxable, even though a
portion of such sales are presumably destined for one of the five states that does not impose a
sales tax. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. While using the average sales tax rate that
the vendor collected on all sales of electronically-transmitted information or services during the
preceding calendar year (see supra text accompanying note 41) mitigates the problem by taking
account of the identifiable sales to non-tax states (which would be included at a zero rate), the rule
is still vulnerable to the charge that it is imposing a tax on some sales that the destination state
chose not to tax.
43. Cf. Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1989) (recognizing, in the context of sales
taxation of telecommunications, that the question of fair apportionment "is essentially a practical
inquiry" and approving the tax regime there at issue because it represented "a realistic legislative
solution to the technology of the present-day telecommunications industry").
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amount to the appropriate jurisdiction.4 4
4.

SEPARATE TREATMENT OF SALES TO REGISTERED BUSINESSES

One important variation on the foregoing statutory structure, which
was suggested in the first report of the Drafting Committee of the
National Tax Association's Communications and Electronic Commerce
Tax Project (hereinafter the "NTA Drafting Committee"),4 5 could contribute significantly to the administrability and enforceability of a sales
and use tax regime redesigned to deal with the problems created by electronic commerce transactions. Essentially, the NTA Drafting Committee proposed to bifurcate sales of electronically-transmitted information
or services into two categories-sales for personal consumption (or to
unregistered businesses) and sales to registered businesses. The NTA
Drafting Committee also created different situsing rules for each
category.4 6
The justification for adopting a separate rule for sales to registered
businesses is that business purchases might otherwise be subject to
manipulation by arrangements designed to ensure that the situs of the
sale would be in a state not taxing the sale of electronically-transmitted
information or services. In addition, business purchases, unlike
purchases for personal consumption, are more likely to be for multiple
points of use, a circumstance that may require the application of an
apportionment mechanism for assigning the sales tax base in an equitable and economically neutral manner. Finally, and most importantly,
registered business purchasers are already obligated and prepared to
self-report and self-assess sales and use taxes to the taxing states on their
existing sales. By extending this concept to sales of electronically-transmitted information and services, the rule would permit self-reporting and
self-assessment for registered business purchasers. This would avoid
considerable complexity in the reporting and payment obligations of the
retailer who will not necessarily have access to all information necessary
to situs sales properly.47 The NTA Drafting Committee's suggestion
that the situs of sales of electronically-transmitted information or serv44. Although a purchaser could refuse to pay the tax, that is no different from a purchaser
refusing to pay a tax today on a bill for a shipment of tangible personal property from a vendor

with nexus in the state. It does not seem to raise any problems peculiar to electronic commerce.
45. See NTA ELECTRONIC COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 1.

46. It is important to note that this was just one of several proposals offered by the NTA
Drafting Committee and that all of its proposals were advanced as preliminary suggestions that
would be subject to further discussion and modification.
47. The NTA Drafting Committee's statutory proposal read, in pertinent part, as follows:

A sale of electronically transmitted information or services to a person the retailer
knows to be registered under [refer to the state's sales and use tax statute] is
presumed to be in this state, if this state falls within the following categories.
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ices to registered businesses be determined on the basis of physical
points of use48 (and apportioned by reference to the relative number of
points of use) is analogous to the California Franchise Tax Board's pro-

posal of a sourcing mechanism for receipts from electronic information
services based on "connection points" within a state.4 9
5.

EVALUATION OF BILLING-ADDRESS NEXUS AND SITUSING REGIME

The proposed nexus and situsing rules have some obvious virtues.

First, they are simple. The vendor need know only the purchaser's billing address to determine the scope of its tax obligations. If a separate
rule for sales to registered businesses were adopted, the vendor would be
relieved of any tax collection obligation with respect to such sales. Second, the rules protect the vendor as long as it makes reasonable efforts5 0
to ascertain the purchaser's billing address. Third, the rules protect the
sales tax base (at least viewed from a national perspective) in the event
that the vendor cannot determine the purchaser's billing address, assuming that the statute incorporated the "throwback" or "throwaround" rule.
These proposed nexus and situsing rules, however, have weaknesses, as well as strengths. First, it may be quite difficult for the vendor to obtain the purchaser's billing address (or other locational data),
where the default regime using the "throwback" or "throwaround" con(1) The sale is made to a single point of use, or multiple points of use all of which
are, inthis
state;
or
(2) The sale is made to multiple points of use both within and without this state, but
only in the proportion that the number of points of use in this state bears a
relationship to the total number of points of use.
NTA ELECTRONIC COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 1265.
48. At least for sales to registered business purchasers.
49. See California Franchise Tax Board, § 25137-13. Telecommunications, Subscription
Television, Internet Access, and Electronic Information Services-Apportionment of Income
(Aug. 20, 1997) (unpublished discussion draft on file with author). Under the draft, gross receipts
from providing information services or Internet access services are attributable to the state under a
series of rules which are based principally on whether the taxpayer has a physical presence in the
state along with a "connection point" (i.e., the physical location of a customer at which a
transmission of information originates or terminates). When information is simultaneously
received at a number of locations, the regulation apportions the tax base among the states
according to the percentage of connection points within the state compared to the total number of
connection points. The regulation also has default rules if the taxpayer is not physically present in
any of the states in which its customer's connection points are located (namely, the state of the
customer's billing address or, if the taxpayer is not physically present in the state of the
customer's billing address, the state in which the taxpayer incurs its costs-of-performance).
50. The statute would presumably provide what efforts would be required. For example, it
might require that, where the billing address was not provided with the purchase, the vendor must
make a reasonable inquiry to determine the purchaser's billing address. It might also require the
vendor to condition the purchase of electronic services by credit card or e-cash upon the
purchaser's furnishing its billing address (or some other proxy for its location-e.g., its area code
and local exchange).
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cept would be the rule rather than the exception, at least for sales other
than to registered businesses. Under those circumstances, the sales and
use tax, which ought to be a levy on consumption, 5' and thus a tax
imposed at the destination state where consumption is ordinarily deemed
to occur, ends up more closely resembling an origin-based tax than a
destination-based tax. 2 The scope of this problem, however, may be
substantially reduced if financial intermediaries can be enlisted to assist

in identifying purchasers' billing addresses-an issue considered separately below.

Second, the rules may be vulnerable to manipulation. For example,
purchasers might establish billing addresses in states without sales

taxes 53 (although a separate rule for registered businesses along the lines
suggested above would tend to reduce this problem). Third, one may

object to the concept of a "throwback" or "throwaround" rule, especially
51. At least in terms of the retail sales tax theory. See supra note 21 and accompanying text
(defining retail sales tax). But see supra note 24 and accompanying text (providing that
producers' purchases make up a significant portion of most states' sales tax).
52. But see supra note 39 (suggesting that a second-best default regime should be evaluated
more on practical than on theoretical grounds).
53. While this may be a possibility in some cases, certainly for many individual purchasers,
the transaction costs of establishing a tax-haven billing address will outweigh the tax savings of
doing so. For larger purchasers, the establishment of a tax-haven billing address may be more
problematic, but it is no different in principle from the problems states face when, for example,
corporations take delivery of corporate aircraft in states without sales taxes. The solution to the
problem in the context of sales of tangible personal property suggests an analogous solution to the
problem in the context of electronic commerce, namely, the use tax. When the corporation uses
the aircraft delivered in a state with a retail sales tax, it pays a use tax to the state identical to the
sales tax it would have paid if the aircraft had originally been purchased in the state. See 2
JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION
18.04[2] (2d ed. 1993)
(discussing corporate aircraft cases).
The same result should occur with respect to the use of information or services purchased in
electronic commerce. If a corporation with an Oregon "billing address" purchases electronicallytransmitted information or services that it uses in states that tax such information or services, the
corporation will owe a use tax to the state in which the information or services are used. Such
liability would presumably be established on audit in the same way that liability is established in
traditional sales and use tax audits-by review of the taxpayer's records to ascertain if any
purchases have been made on which sales or use tax was due but not paid. See DUE & MIKESELL,
supra note 20, at 223.
As Due and Mikesell observe:
Business firms frequently make out-of-state purchases of equipment, supplies, and
other taxable items tax free and fail to pay use tax, or purchase such goods in-state
under exemption certificate and fail to account for tax themselves. One of the
principal audit checks is to determine failure to pay tax on these purchases . . ..
[F]requently purchase invoices are checked to see whether tax was applied by the
supplier. Even where the rest of the audit is done by sample, these large-ticket-price
accounts may be audited in detail. Examination of income tax returns aids in
revealing purchases on which tax should have been paid. Many states report that
this activity constitutes a large portion of audit work.
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in the sales tax context, as changing tax attribution rules "in the middle
of the stream" for reasons that cannot be justified by the underlying
purposes of a retail sales tax.54
Whatever the shortcomings of the foregoing provisions, they may
nevertheless serve as a useful focus for further discussion of legislative
solutions to nexus and situsing issues raised by sales and use taxation of
electronic commerce.
B.

The Scope of the Unidentifiable PurchaserProblem: Enlisting
Financial Intermediaries in the Effort to Identify
Purchasers' Billing Addresses

One of the critical issues raised by the proposal of a billingaddress-based nexus and situsing regime55 is the ability to identify the
purchaser's billing address. In some instances, of course, vendors will
have (or be able to require purchasers to furnish) billing information
(e.g., in an on-line purchase of a book from Amazon.com). But this will
not be true for many Internet sales "due to security concerns about credit
card information and the fact that often the seller has no idea who the
purchaser is." 56 In some transactions, financial intermediaries such as
Cybercash provide encrypted codes for Internet sales to avoid the risk of
unwanted disclosure of a purchaser's credit card information.5 7 Since
the Internet seller never sees the credit card number and may not know
the identity of the purchaser, it may contend that it cannot obtain such
information through "reasonable and good faith efforts."5 8
To be sure, insofar as it is impossible to identify the purchaser's
billing address, one may adopt a default situsing mechanism (such as the
"throwback" or "throwaround" rules described above)5 9 that eliminates
the problem of "nowhere" sales. Nevertheless, if we knew at the outset
that the percentage of sales to unidentifiable purchasers would be substantial, we might hesitate before adopting a billing-address nexus and
situsing regime, because the "exception" (the default principle) would
swallow the "rule" and leave us with an unsatisfactory distribution of
sales tax revenues.6 °
To the best of my knowledge, there is currently no empirical estimate as to the magnitude of this problem. Whatever its magnitude, how54. See Hellerstein, supra note 31, at 778-79.
55. See supra Part III.A.
56. R. Scot Grierson, State Taxation of the Information Superhighway: A Proposal for
Taxation of Information Services, 16 Loy. ENT. L.J. 603, 643 (1996).
57. See id.

58. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 37-43, and supra Part III.A.2.
60. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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ever, the scope of the problem would be substantially reduced if thirdparty financial intermediaries could be enlisted to help identify purchasers' billing addresses. Indeed, the paradigmatic electronic commerce
transaction that vendors typically describe to illustrate their inability to
identify their purchasers' billing addresses is the credit card purchase of
electronically-transmitted information.
This raises two additional questions. First, do third-party financial
intermediaries possess the information which, if made available to
remote vendors, would allow such remote vendors to comply with a billing-address situsing regime? Second, if so, would it be reasonable to
impose on financial intermediaries the obligation to provide such information to remote vendors?
The answer to the first question appears to be "yes." After all, the
financial institutions that send us our monthly credit card bills know our
addresses. Otherwise they would not stay in business very long.
Indeed, even the financial services industry, which has vigorously
opposed any suggestion that it should be required to provide customer
address information to vendors in connection with credit card transactions, does not deny that it possesses the relevant information. 6 Rather,
its opposition is based on its response to the second question posed
above, namely, whether it "would... be reasonable to impose on financial intermediaries the obligation to provide such information to remote
vendors."6 2
But, there are many who do not share that view. For example, the
United States Communications Association ("USCA"), a trade association of the nation's long-distance and local telecommunications companies, takes the position that the involvement of financial intermediaries
in implementing a billing-address situsing regime is both reasonable and
necessary:

63

It appears to the USCA that the financial intermediary is the only
party to the transaction that possesses necessary information to make
this proposed regime work-the billing address (i.e., the state) of the
purchaser. As part of the approval process for every charge by a
vendor to the credit card of a purchaser, the vendor is provided with
confirmation that the credit card has not been reported lost or stolen,
there is adequate credit available to cover the purchase price, and an
61. See Comments on Behalf of the Financial Institutions State Tax Coalition on the National
Tax Association Communications and Electronic Commerce Tax Project and Report No. 1 of the
Drafting Committee (Dec. 25, 1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter FIST Coalition Comments].
62. Id. See also infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text for an elaboration of these views.
63. Comments on Behalf of the U.S. Communications Association on Report No. I of the
Drafting Committee of the National Tax Association Communications and Electronic Commerce
Tax Project 4-5 (Dec. 24, 1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter USCA Comments].
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approval code reflecting the first two items. USCA believes it is
essential to this regime that financial intermediaries provide the vendor, in addition to the approval code, a two digit code reflecting the
Billing Address (i.e., the state) of the purchaser. Clearly with a data
base providing such current data as the lost/stolen status and available
credit balance, the additional information . . . relating to the state

where billing occurs can be included in the data base. 64
Other observers espouse similar sentiments.65
Even those who support the enlistment of financial intermediaries
in the implementation of a billing-address regime recognize that it will
impose "some incremental burden on financial intermediaries. ' 66 They
view such a burden as neither unreasonable nor unusual. Thus, "the
USCA believes it is not unreasonable to expect parties to such transactions to provide information necessary to effect not only the transaction
but also to effect the collection of taxes on the transaction. '67 Using the
telecommunications industry as an example of an industry that has
implemented many burdensome changes in its billing systems to accommodate changes in technology, the USCA observes:
Originating information on each and every one of hundreds of millions of telephone calls is transmitted every day to and from local
exchange companies to long distance companies on calling card
transactions, 800 calls and 900 calls, from local exchange companies
to cellular and PCS providers, and from pay phone providers to long
distance providers. These are just a few of the many, many requirements for originating information being provided from one telecommunications company to another to facilitate the proper billing of
charges and taxes on telecommunications services.6 8
64. Id. at 4. The USCA further observes that "[slimilarly, with cybercash, the cybercash
provider is the only party to the transaction that, one way or another, knows where the actual cash
is coming from. Whether paid directly by check or by a credit card, the cybercash provider will
have some state level information that can be used in determining Billing Address." Id.
65. See Grierson, supra note 56, at 643. Grierson suggests that:

To obtain billing address information in an Internet transaction (and for information
services using other types of telecommunications), the state could impose a duty on
the seller to acquire the billing address information through the third-party
intermediary. Third-party intermediaries are in a perfect position to obtain billing

address information without compromising security because the credit card number
is never divulged.
Id. at 643. To facilitate this process, Congress or state legislatures might need to enact laws

requiring credit card companies and other financial intermediaries to honor the vendor's request
for billing address information. Additionally, the law would need to restrict the use of such information fulfilling legitimate tax collection obligations in order to protect the purchaser's privacy
interests.
66. USCA Comments, supra note 63, at 5.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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Similarly, while sellers may balk at this type of requirement as
being "administratively cumbersome because it requires them to coordinate tax collection with the billing intermediary, 6 9 such arrangements
are not uncommon:
The typical 900 number service, for example, uses the telephone
company as a third-party billing intermediary, just as Internet sellers
will use Cybercash. The telephone company bills the 900 service
customer by including the charge in the phone bill. Under such a
requirement, the seller would contract with the intermediary for collection of the charge, the intermediary would determine the state
according to billing address, and the appropriate sales tax would be
collected, passed on to the seller, and remitted by the seller to the
state.7 °
It is important to note that when third-party intermediaries (such as telephone companies) perform billing functions for remote vendors, they
ordinarily receive compensation for such services. 7' This suggests that,
if the burdensome reporting requirements are going to be imposed on
financial intermediaries, they should be reimbursed for the costs of
undertaking that task.
This is one of the many points the financial services industry raises
in opposition to requiring financial intermediaries to provide billing
address information to remote vendors as part of the credit card authorization process.72 It also points out that financial intermediaries cannot
currently provide billing address information without the purchaser's
permission due to legal privacy and fraud prevention concerns. 73 But
these legal restraints could be removed by legislation and would presumably include appropriate safeguards for those providing the information.
The more fundamental concern of the financial services industry is
plainly the cost involved in implementing systems changes that would
be necessary to provide the requisite billing information. Despite the
69. Grierson, supra note 56, at 643.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Connecticut Department of Revenue, July 2, 1991, reprinted in 2 CONN. ST.
TAx REP. (CCH) 360-421 (describing typical 900-number service and noting that, in a typical
900-number service, the telephone company deducts from the amount otherwise due the vendor of

the 900-number service a charge for the service of collecting the 900-number service provider's
fee). Opinion of the Tax Commissioner, No. TC 90-0008, Nov. 27, 1990, reprinted in OHIO ST.
TAX REP. (CCH) 401-004 [1991-92 Transfer Binder] (same).
72. See FIST Coalition Comments, supra note 61; Financial Institution State Tax Coalition,
Extent of "Anonymous" Electronic Commerce (EC) Transactions & Role of 3rd Party
Intermediaries (undated), submitted to Meeting of Steering Committee of National Tax
Association's Communications and Electronic Commerce Tax Project (Feb. 4, 1998) (on file with
author) [hereinafter FIST Coalition Supplemental Comments].
73. See FIST Coalition Comments, supra note 61, at 3; see FIST Coalition Supplemental
Comments, supra note 72.
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industry's initial unconditional opposition to any suggestion along these
lines,'7 it more recently articulated a more flexible response, 75 but urged
that any consideration of drafting third-party financial intermediaries
into the process of providing billing address information to remote vendors must address the following concerns:
(1) systems would need to have the capacity to report billing
addresses for any potential transaction, even though only a small portion of authorized transactions would need the information from the
third party intermediary;
(2) serious consideration would have to be given to simplified
reporting requirements (e.g., two-digit state code or five-digit zip
code as distinguished from full address);
(3) information would have to be provided without materially
slowing down the authorization process;
(4) the systems would have to be sufficiently flexible to deal
with emerging products (e.g., cybercash);
(5) any discussion of merchant's discount (i.e., reimbursement
for sales tax collection) should include means for reimbursing the
third party intermediaries for additional systems costs;
(6) customer concerns and legal requirements regarding privacy
would need to be addressed;
(7) other parties would need to be involved in the process (such
as the Master Card/VISA organizations as well as the American
Bankers Association). 76
In the end, the possibility of enlisting third-party financial
intermediaries to implement a billing-address situs regime for state sales
taxation of electronic commerce (and other remote sellers) appears to
offer a promising solution to the problem of identifying the billing
address of purchasers who may be unidentifiable under current practices.
It is true, of course, that the full ramifications of implementing such a
system have yet to be explored. We clearly need additional information
regarding the magnitude of the unidentifiable purchaser problem as well
as the cost to the financial services industry of providing billing
addresses. Nevertheless, the cooperation of financial intermediaries
could go a long way toward resolving one of the key issues raised by
adopting a billing-address regime.
C.

Uniformity, Simplicity, and Administrability

As a matter of principle, there is widespread consensus among
interested (and disinterested) observers that any viable solution to the
74. See FIST Coalition Comments, supra note 61.
75. See FIST Coalition Supplemental Comments, supra note 72.
76. Id.
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problem of state taxation of electronic commerce will need to be uniform, simple, and administrable. As one of the numerous "white
papers" devoted to state and local taxation of electronic commerce
noted:
No matter how perfectly a taxing system may comport with other
requirements of tax policy, if a tax is difficult to understand, if compliance burdens are excessive, and if the costs of administering the
tax are unreasonable, the tax will fail to serve its basic function as an
effective raiser of revenue.7 7

The Interactive Services Association and the Information Technology
Association of America, in their "white papers" on taxation of electronic
commerce, stress the goal of uniformity, asserting that "if states do
impose taxes on Internet and online services, they should adopt uniform
definitions among the states"7 8 and that "[w]hatever standards are
applied should be done uniformly from state to state and from taxpayer
to taxpayer."79 Yet another "white paper" on electronic commerce similarly declares that if electronic commerce is going to be taxed, such
taxes should be "clear and consistent" so that "taxpayers can comply
with the rules and take them into account for purposes of business decisions." 80 State tax organizations, no less than business groups, fully
embrace the "goal[ ] of ... administrative ease and efficiency"8 in taxa-

tion of electronic commerce.
The goals of uniformity, simplicity, and administrability are obviously overlapping and reinforcing, since a uniform system is likely to be
simple and administrable; a simple system is likely to be uniform and
administrable; and an administrable system is likely to be uniform and
simple. Moreover, these goals are by no means limited to electronic
commerce. Many of the suggestions for increased uniformity, simplicity, and administrability apply broadly to sales and use taxation and,
indeed, may be essential to the survival of the retail sales tax in an
increasingly service and information-oriented economy characterized by
the mobility of factors of production.82
The critical questions are how these homilies can be translated into
specific, concrete proposals that will achieve the widely accepted goals
of uniformity, simplicity, and administrability, and how achievement of
77. SALT Study Group White Paper, supra note 18, at 61.
78. ISA White Paper, supra note 13, at 221 (emphasis in original omitted).
79. ITAA White Paper, supra note 12, at 10.
80. Karl A. Frieden & Michael E. Porter, The Taxation of Cyberspace: State Tax Issues
Related to the Internet and Electronic Commerce, I I STATE TAX NOTES 1363, 1396 (1996).
81. Multistate Tax Commission, Statement of Direction on Electronic Commerce Issues 2
(Jan. 17, 1997), available in <http://www.mtc.gov/policy/97-4.htm> (visited Mar. 3, 1998).

82. See generally
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(1998); McLure, supra note 27.
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these goals can be squared with traditional notions of state and local
sovereignty. The initial report of the Drafting Committee of the
National Tax Association's Communications and Electronic Commerce
Tax Project,83 as well as the comments that were submitted by both
business and government groups in connection with that project,84 have
advanced a number of specific proposals to implement these goals.
1.

UNIFORM DEFINITIONS

One specific proposal that commands broad support is the adoption
of uniform definitions of taxable and exempt items in the sales tax base.
The current system is characterized by a maze of overlapping and inconsistent definitions of similar or identical products and services from state
to state (and, in some cases, from locality to locality). For the vendor
selling its products in more than one state, the lack of uniformity in the
delineation of the tax base creates an administrative and compliance
nightmare.
Business groups take the position that "[a]bsolute uniformity is
required among the states regarding the definition of relevant terms and
concepts."8 5 Government groups "recognize that uniformity in sales tax
bases would make many other issues of complexity disappear"8 6 and
that "it would be desirable ... to work toward a system in which key
elements of the tax base are defined uniformly from state to state, with
the policy makers in each state choosing to tax or not to tax a given
category at their discretion."8 " These government groups are somewhat
skeptical, however, about the possibility of achieving complete uniformity. Consequently, they express uncertainty as to the source of such
definitions. 8
The existence of uniform definitions is central to any effort at sales
83. See NTA ELECTRONIC COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 1.
84. See NTA Business Group's Suggested Simplification Measuresfor Sales and Use Taxes
(Dec. 10, 1997) (submitted in connection with the National Tax Association's Communications
and Electronic Commerce Tax Project), available in <http://www.cob.asu.edu/nta> [hereinafter
Business Groups' Simplification Suggestions]; Government Members of Steering Committee, NTA

Communications and Electronic Commerce Tax Project, Preliminary Statement of Direction,
Achieving Simplification and Uniformity in State and Local Sales and Use Tax Administration
(Jan. 14, 1998) (submitted in connection with the National Tax Association's Communications
and Electronic Commerce Tax Project), available in <http://www.cob.asu.edu/nta> [hereinafter
Government Members' Simplification Suggestions]; Memorandum, Business Groups' Discussion
Outline for the Feb. 4th Meeting (Jan. 23, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Business
Groups' Supplemental Simplification Suggestions].
85. Business Groups' Simplification Suggestions, supra note 84, at 1. See also Business
Groups' Supplemental Simplification Suggestions, supra note 84, at 2.
86. Government Members' Simplification Suggestions, supra note 84, at 3.

87. Id. (emphasis in original).
88. See id. at 3-4.
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tax simplification, and there exists substantial agreement between business and government interests on the desirability of achieving definitional uniformity. Therefore, there is every reason to believe that
substantial progress can be made to achieve such uniformity, which
could lay the foundation for progress in other areas. There are a number
of possible sources for the uniform definitions (e.g., the U.S. Department of Commerce classifications or the U.S. Department of Treasury
classifications used in administering Customs rules). Moreover, the key
elements of uniformity-namely, uniformity in definitions-can be
achieved without seriously infringing on state sovereignty about what to
tax:
Perhaps one cannot expect the states to yield sovereignty over the
choice of the tax base, that is to adopt a uniform sales tax base. But
there is no principled reason they should not adopt a uniform set of
definitions that would be used in establishing their tax bases. If, for
example, there were a detailed and uniform set of definitions of products that might be either taxed or exempted, each state could then
choose whether or not to tax each product .... Knowing that what
they sell is defined the same way in all states, vendors would need
only to know whether each of their products is taxed in each of the
states where they make sales. The rules for how each state taxes each
product-essentially yes or no-could relatively easily be built into
software programs.89
In short, the adoption of uniform definitions in the sales tax base would
substantially ease compliance and administrative burdens for those
engaged in electronic commerce (and in other activities) in more than
one state.
2.

UNIFORM ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

Although not as intellectually tantalizing as some of the issues one
confronts in connection with state taxation of electronic commerce (and
state sales taxation generally), the adoption of uniform and simplified
administrative procedures is another significant issue that is inextricably
intertwined with any workable solution to the electronic commerce
problem. However, the substantive issues regarding sales and use taxation of electronic commerce are resolved, and particularly if current
nexus rules are to be altered along the lines suggested above, there will
need to be substantial simplification and increased uniformity in the
administration of the sales tax to make compliance for remote sellers on
a multistate basis both practical and acceptable. 90
89. McLure, supra note 27, at 1177 (emphasis in original).
90. The substance of the following discussion of uniform administrative procedures draws
freely from the NTA Electronic Commerce Report, supra note 1, and is derived, in large part, from
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Taxpayer Registration

Currently, each seller with responsibility (or voluntarily accepting
the responsibility) to collect sales tax on behalf of the state is required to
register with the state to evidence the obligation and establish the appropriate accounts and files. This is accomplished by completion of a regis-

tration form with certain demographic information about the seller, its
principal officers, and other operations in the state. This is done individually with each state, and increasingly involves registration with other
appropriate agencies in the state (e.g., unemployment insurance agency,
other tax agencies, and Secretary of State). Some states require the post-

ing of a bond or other insurance to insure collection.
A system could be developed where a vendor could register in all
states using one standard registration form containing the information
required by each state (or supplemented for certain states if necessary).
Alternatively, a system could be developed under which a seller could
complete a single registration form that would be filed with a single
entity which would, in turn, provide the required information to all other
jurisdictions. This single entity could be a third-party agent or instrumentality9" authorized to act on behalf of all states, or it could be a
single state chosen by the seller (e.g., home state or base state). 92
Depending on the manner in which states ultimately choose to operate,
conversations and negotiations between the states and direct marketers (as well as other remote
sellers and taxpayers) about the areas of sales tax administration that create the greatest
compliance burdens. The suggested options draw heavily on those sources, as well as discussions
that have occurred within the Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) Sales Tax Simplification
Advisory Committee.
91. The "third party agent" approach could be a new or existing state's instrumentality or a
private entity under contract to the state. Issues regarding its activities and functions, however,
need to be explored. For example, the single entity could perform the functions of a processor and
distributor of information to the states which would, in turn, be responsible for all other aspects of
administration. The current FedState electronic filing program resembles this approach, in which
a federal and state individual income tax return can be filed through a single transmission to the
IRS. Alternatively, the central entity could perform certain functions centrally on behalf of the
participating states, much like the MTC multistate audit program. There are, of course, variations
on this theme and other points along the continuum.
92. The "base state" approach could be modeled along the lines of the International Fuel Tax
Agreement (IFrA) for the administration of motor fuel use taxes of interstate motor carriers
among states. Under this agreement, the carrier registers with, and reports to, a single state (the
base state) which, in turn, is responsible for distributing the proceeds among all other states in
which the carrier has activity. The base state also audits the carrier and provides the other states
with all other necessary information. States are in the process of establishing a central
clearinghouse to act as a repository of certain information necessary to the administration of
IFTA, but not to perform functions centrally on behalf of all states. New York State, for example,
has developed and operates a Regional Processing Center (RPC) that furnishes IFTA tax return
processing services to about eighteen jurisdictions (including at least two Canadian provinces).
The RPC provides a range of services from receiving returns and processing return data to
handling financial transactions. However, it does not conduct audits or delinquency control.
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the registration information could be provided to all states or retained
centrally.
b.

Tax Returns and Remittances

Currently, each registered retailer is required to file a return individually with each state in which it is registered and to make remittances
of the tax collected and due to each of those jurisdictions. Returns are
commonly filed on a monthly basis and contain entries for gross sales,
exempt sales, taxes due on consumed goods, net taxable sales, tax due,
tax remitted, and other items. The returns (where appropriate) also contain a schedule highlighting local sales and use tax collected by the jurisdiction in which (or for which) it was collected. In most states, the
majority of large retailers are required to make remittances by Electronic
Funds Transfer (EFT). In most cases, remittances are required monthly,
but may be required more frequently in certain instances. Sometimes,
remittances must include an estimate for part of the current month and a
reconciliation for the prior month. Several states have established electronic sales tax filing programs for both returns and remittances; however, with a couple of exceptions, participation is not currently
widespread.
A system could be developed under which a uniform or standard
tax return and remittance form would be used in each state. This
approach could also include uniformity or standardization of the tax
return due dates and the like. Alternatively, as with registration forms, a
system could be developed under which a seller could complete a single
return and remittance that would be filed with a single entity which
would, in turn, provide the required information to all other
jurisdictions ."
c.

Taxpayer Audits

Currently, taxpayers are subject to audit in each state in which they
are registered to determine whether the appropriate amount of tax has
been collected and remitted. Methods of audit selection and audit techniques vary among the states. Taxpayers' primary concern with the
audit process is that they are subject to audit by multiple states, which is
a time-consuming and burdensome process.
A system could be adopted that requires states to cooperate in the
audit process and limit the number of audits to an individual seller
within any tax period. The limit could be one audit per period or some
93. If the system called for a uniform due date, only a single return (with information for all
states) would be required. If differing due dates were allowed, all returns could still be filed with
a single entity.
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other number. The joint audits could be conducted by a single state on
behalf of all states, a group of states on behalf of all, or a third party on
behalf of all states.94
Collection Allowances

d.

Currently, about one-half of the sales tax states allow retailers, who
make timely returns and remittances, to retain a portion of the tax collected as partial compensation for the costs of collection. These
allowances are generally expressed in percentage terms (usually less
than two percent), and are often capped at a certain dollar amount to
benefit small retailers. As noted above, 95 the "collection allowance"
should be expanded to include consideration of reimbursing third-party
financial intermediaries if they are required to incur substantial costs in
furnishing taxpayer identification information.
Exemption Certificates

e.

Beyond exempting various goods and services from the sales tax,
states also exempt certain types of entities from tax on certain purchases
they make. Generally, sellers must retain some documentation received
from the buyer indicating a tax exempt purchase was made and the reason for the tax exemption. There is some variety in the types of documentation required, and the sheer handling of multiple exemption forms
from multiple states creates a burden for sellers. This burden could be
reduced by developing uniform procedures for documenting exempt
transactions of this nature and establishing uniform standards for acceptance and retention of the documentation.

3.

DE MNIMIS RULES

Implementing any sensible tax regime for electronic commerce
would be facilitated by adopting de minimis safe harbor rules to protect
small vendors and to assure that the compliance costs do not exceed the
tax revenues at stake. Indeed, for the small enterprise making relatively
modest sales into a number of states, the compliance burden of determining the billing addresses of its customers could be overwhelming.
Accordingly, the obligation of a vendor to determine its customer's billing address might be limited to vendors making more than, say,
94. The Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) currently operates a joint audit program with
approximately twenty-five states for both sales/use tax and corporation income tax. Among the
participating states, the MTC routinely audits ten to fifteen of them in accordance with the laws of
that state. The MTC auditor takes it to the point at which a recommended assessment/refund is
made. At that point, the audit process is turned over to individual states for a final assessment/
refund determination and handling of any appeals.
95. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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$250,000 of sales. At the same time, to avoid revenue losses, one could
require small vendors to remit all taxes collected to the state from which

the electronic transmission originated or to the taxpayer's principal place
96
of business under a default situsing rule.
4.

LOCAL TAXES

One of the most important-and most controversial-challenges to
uniformity, simplicity, and administrability in state sales tax systems as
applied to electronic commerce (as well as to other activities) is the local

taxation problem. As the Supreme Court noted in Quill, while there may
be only forty-five states with sales taxes, there are more than 6,000 state
and local jurisdictions with such taxes. 97 Any meaningful solution to

sales and use taxation of electronic commerce cannot ignore the more
than ninety-nine percent of the jurisdictions with power to impose such
taxes.
The business community is adamant in its view that there must be
complete uniformity between state and local taxes in both base and

rate. 98 The states, while sympathetic to the business community's desire
for a "one rate per state" approach, nevertheless believe that the possibil-

ity of maintaining diverse rates at reasonable administrative costs should
be explored in light of developments in technology and tax compliance
software, particularly since the "one rate per state" approach could be

thwarted by state constitutional requirements.99

Notwithstanding the states' misgivings, it is difficult to escape from
the conclusion that such powers must be severely curtailed, if not altogether prohibited, in any workable tax regime applied to electronic com-

merce, in light of the extraordinary compliance burdens that independent
local base- or rate-making rules introduce into the existing sales tax
structure.' 0 0 Congressional bills introduced to provide for state taxation

of mail-order sales have already embraced this principle."0 ' Whatever
96. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text. A statutory provision implementing such
a default regime might read as follows:
Any vendor whose gross receipts from the sale of electronically-transmitted
information or services during the preceding calendar year did not exceed $_
may elect to treat all of its sales for the succeeding calendar year as if they were
made to a purchaser in the state of the vendor's principal place of business.
97. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 n.6 (1992).
98. See Business Groups' Simplification Suggestions, supra note 84; Business Groups'
Supplemental Simplification Suggestions, supra note 84.
99. Government Members' Simplification Suggestions, supra note 84, at 3.
100. See McLure, supra note 27, at 1177-80.
101. See, e.g., Consumer and Main Street Protection Act of 1997, S. 1586, 105th Cong., 2d
Sess. (Jan. 29, 1998). Under the bill, Congress removes Quill's Commerce Clause bar on
requiring vendors without physical presence in the state to collect sales and use taxes, and it
authorizes the states to require a vendor who is subject to the state's personal jurisdiction under
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state constitutional objections might be raised °2to such provisions are

likely to be either unsuccessful or short-lived.
IV.

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Any effort to design legislation establishing uniform rules for state
taxation of electronic commerce must consider the constitutional concerns that such legislation might raise. The states, of course, are
restricted by the Commerce and Due Process clauses in exercising their
taxing power over interstate commerce and out-of-state taxpayers.

While some of the statutory provisions set forth above might pass muster under existing constitutional restraints, others plainly would not. For
example, the sales and use tax provision creating a tax collection responsibility for an out-of-state vendor of electronically-transmitted information or services based on the existence of a purchaser with an in-state
billing address would, at least in some applications, clearly be unconstitutional under Quill.' 3 More fundamentally, if one of the principal purposes of creating a uniform taxing statute is to establish clarity and
certainty in an area currently beset by confusion and doubt, the last thing
the Due Process Clause to collect state and local taxes if, among other things, such local taxes are
"uniform." See id. § 3. Sales taxes imposed by local jurisdictions are "uniform" if:
(A) such local taxes are imposed at the same rate and on identical transactions
in all geographic areas of the State, and
(B) such local sales taxes imposed on sales by out-of-State persons are
collected and administered by the State.
Id. § 4.
102. There is no question that Congress has broad authority to prescribe the rules under which
the states (and their political subdivisions) may tax interstate commerce. See Part IV infra. The
question here is whether Congress, having authorized the states (and localities) to tax interstate
commerce in a particular way, can empower the states to override their own internal legal or
constitutional restraints. Presently, Congress may do so when it acts in a prohibitory mode. For
example, Congress can prevent the states from taxing railroad property more onerously than other
commercial and industrial property in the state, even if the state's own constitution provides that
railroad property (along with other utility property) is to be assessed at a higher percentage of fair
market value than other commercial and industrial property. See Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, 49 U.S.C. § 14502 (1996). On the other hand, if Congress
authorizes the states to impose sales taxes on interstate commerce only if there is a single
"blended" state tax rate, but the state for some reason lacks the internal constitutional authority to
require a combination of state and local rates, one might maintain that the state would not have
authority to tax interstate commerce under state law. In the unlikely event that a court would so
hold, the fiscal and political pressures on the state to amend its constitution to capture revenues
from interstate commerce would be such that any such limitation on state taxing powers is likely
to be temporary. Indeed, to deal with this problem, Congress could postpone the effective date of
the statute to allow states to amend their laws or constitutions, if necessary, to conform to the
requirements of the federal statute. This is precisely what Congress did in enacting section 306 of
the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, postponing the effective date of
the provision prohibiting discrimination against railroad property for three years to permit states to
amend their laws to conform to the federal nondiscrimination principle.
103. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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we need is a statutory regime that will trigger significant constitutional
controversy. For that reason, the wiser course in attempting to implement any significant restructuring of the present pattern of state taxation
of electronic commerce is to seek congressional approval.
The remaining question is whether congressional action in this
domain-whether through consent to legislation requiring states to
develop on their own initiative or by affirmative federal legislation that
is thrust upon unwilling states-can resolve the Commerce and Due
Process clause difficulties.
The answer to half of this question is easy. Congress possesses
ample power to remove any Commerce Clause impediment to legislation of the type described above. 104 Thus, Congress may consent to state
legislation affecting interstate commerce that would be unconstitutional
under the so-called "dormant" Commerce Clause in the absence of such
consent, and it may preempt state legislation that would be constitutional
under the clause in the absence of such preemption. Because it has plenary power over the channels of interstate commerce, "Congress may
keep the way open, confine it broadly or closely, or close it entirely,"',1 5
subject only to the restrictions placed upon congressional authority by
other constitutional provisions. Since the legislation under consideration
indisputably has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, there can be
no serious question of any Commerce Clause bar to such legislation, if
10 6
Congress either consents to it or affirmatively enacts it.
The answer to the other half of the question is more difficult. That
question is whether congressional consent to (or enactment of) legislation of the type described above would eliminate any due process objections to such legislation or its application. The question must be
answered in two parts. First, would the foregoing draft legislation
authorize violations of the Due Process Clause and, if so, does Congress
have the power to eliminate the due process bar?
The answer to the first part of the question depends on whether a
state would have the "definite link" or "minimum connection" that the
Due Process Clause requires "between a state and the person, property
or transaction it seeks to tax."' 0 7 As noted above, the Court in Quill
construed this requirement to remove any condition that the "link" or
"connection" be physical: "The requirements of due process
are met
104. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 434 (1946) (sustaining a state tax that
allegedly discriminated against interstate commerce because Congress had consented to such

legislation).
105. Id.
106. Cf. Quill, 504 U.S. at 318 ("Congress is ... free to decide whether, when, and to what
extent the States may burden interstate mail-order concerns with a duty to collect use taxes.").
107. Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954).
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irrespective of a corporation's lack of physical presence in the taxing
State." 10 8 What is required is that the out-of-state taxpayer "purposefully direct" its activities towards residents of the taxing state. 10 9
Whether a billing-address nexus standard would satisfy this criterion is
open to question and might require resolution on a case-by-case basis.
The answer to the second part of the question is likewise subject to
debate. The Court in dicta has declared that "while Congress has ple-

nary power to regulate commerce among the States and thus may
authorize state actions that burden interstate commerce ....it does not
similarly have the power to authorize violations of the Due Process
Clause."' 10 Nevertheless, one can credibly argue that Congress has
power to consent to violations of the Due Process Clause as long as they
are not restraints by which Congress itself is bound."' Under this the-

ory, Congress can authorize what would otherwise be federalism-based
violations of the Due Process Clause, but not due process violations of

individual rights.
In the end, it seems unlikely that the U.S. Supreme Court would
hold that the framers of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment
left the nation powerless, short of a constitutional amendment, to legislate an administratively workable solution to the problem of state taxa-

tion of electronic commerce, despite the joint exercise by Congress
and
2
the states of their respective powers under the Constitution."1
108. Quill, 504 U.S. at 308.
109. See id.

110. Id. at 305. See also id. at 318; ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307,
350 n.14 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
1l1. See William Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate UnconstitutionalState Laws: A
Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REV. 387, 388-89 (1983) (discussing confusion

over Congress' scope of authority over state laws); see also generally William Cohen,
Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27

STAN.

L. REV. 603

(1975).
112. As Professor Donald Regan, an eminent constitutional scholar, has put it:
The crucial question then becomes: Can Congress overturn Supreme Court
decisions invalidating state laws on grounds of extra-territoriality? It is an
understatement to say there is no settled doctrine on this question. Nonetheless, I
would confidently expect the Court to hold that Congress can overturn most, if not
all, such decisions, precisely because extra-territoriality is more a matter of
federalism than of fundamental fairness.
Letter from Donald H. Regan to Chairman Peter W. Rodino, Jr., U.S. House of Representatives,
regarding the "Constitutionality of H.R. 3521 and Similar Bills Authorizing States to Require Tax
Collection by Mail-Order Sellers," in Interstate Sales Tax Collection Act of 1987 and the Equity in
Interstate Competition Act of 1987: Hearingson H.R. 1242, H.R. 1891, and H.R. 3521 Before the
Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 708 (1989); see also Jerome R. Hellerstein, Significant Sales and Use Tax Developments
During the Past Half Century, 39 VANO. L. REV. 961, 986-92 (1986).

